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Abstract
The president has come to be known as our chief legislator within the past fifty years, with Franklin Roosevelt and his successors taking a much more active role in the legislative process than nineteenth-century presidents took. Despite elaborate efforts and a fully developed congressional liaison capacity in the White House, however, only three presidents have been markedly successful with Congress: Franklin Roosevelt, Lyndon Johnson, and Ronald Reagan. This article examines some of the lessons that have been learned about presidential effectiveness with Congress. Even the most successful presidents, however, have not been able to sustain their legislative effectiveness throughout their terms, and this article analyzes the frustrations of divided government and proposals for constitutional reform to alleviate the problem. The article concludes that whether one approves of these reform proposals depends how one conceives of the problem.
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